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Abstract
This monograph reviews shareholder activism by hedge funds. We ﬁrst
describe the nature and characteristics of hedge fund activism, includ-
ing the objectives, tactics, and choices of target companies. We then
analyze possible value creation brought about by activist hedge funds,
both for shareholders in the target companies and for investors in the
hedge funds. The evidence generally supports the view that hedge fund
activism creates value for shareholders by eﬀectively inﬂuencing the
governance, capital structure decisions, and operating performance of
target ﬁrms.
Keywords: Hedge fund; shareholder activism; corporate governance.
1
Introduction
During the past decade, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new
form of corporate governance mechanism that brings about opera-
tional, ﬁnancial, and governance reforms in the corporation. Share-
holder activism (Gillan and Starks, 2007; Karpoﬀ, 2001) and more
broadly, large investors’ monitoring of corporate managers (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986; Grossman and Hart, 1980) are not new phenomena
in capital markets around the world. In the United States, institutional
investors such as pension funds and mutual funds have been actively
engaging in the management of the invested ﬁrms since the 1980s with
the goal of improving shareholder value. However, the early institu-
tional shareholder activism has been plagued by many regulatory and
structural barriers such as free-rider problems and conﬂict of interest
(Black, 1990). As a result, the evidence on the eﬀect of their activist
eﬀorts has largely been mixed (Gillan and Starks, 2007).1
Hedge fund activism distinguishes itself from other institutional
activism in a number of aspects. First, hedge fund managers have
stronger ﬁnancial incentives to make proﬁts. Hedge funds generally
1One exception is Bethel et al. (1998), who provide evidence for successful activist block-
holders in the 1980s.
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receive a signiﬁcant proportion (e.g., 20%) of excess returns as perfor-
mance fees on top of ﬁxed management fees. Moreover, the managers
of hedge funds invest a substantial amount from their personal wealth
into their own funds. This strong incentive for high investment returns
in the compensation structure contrasts with that of mutual fund or
pension fund managers, which usually does not allow managers to cap-
ture a signiﬁcant portion of (excess) returns. Second, hedge funds are
lightly regulated since they are not widely available to the public but
only to institutional clients and a limited number of wealthy individu-
als. Therefore, hedge funds are not subject to strict ﬁduciary standards
(such as those embodied in ERISA), and this in turn allows them to
have much more ﬂexibility to intervene in the invested companies. For
example, since the law does not require hedge funds to maintain diver-
siﬁed portfolios as required for some other institutional investors, they
can take large and concentrated stakes in target ﬁrms more easily. Fur-
ther, they can use derivative securities or trade on margin to hedge or
leverage their stakes with a given capital. These are important advan-
tages for activist shareholders to have inﬂuence over the target ﬁrms’
management.
Third, hedge funds face fewer conﬂicts of interest than some other
institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pension funds, who
often have other business relations with the invested companies or have
non-ﬁnancial agendas and goals. Hedge fund managers rarely face this
sort of conﬂicts. Lastly, hedge funds usually have lock-up provisions
that restrict the investors from withdrawing their principal. Given that
hedge fund activists invest in target ﬁrms for more than a year on
average to pursue their strategies, this feature aﬀords the managers
an extended ﬂexibility to focus on intermediate- and long-term activist
objectives.
To summarize, hedge fund activists are a new breed of shareholder
activists that are equipped with more suitable ﬁnancial incentives and
organizational structures for pursuing activism agendas than earlier
generations of institutional activists. Not surprisingly, they turn out to
be successful in facilitating signiﬁcant changes in corporate governance
and operations of target ﬁrms, and in turn achieving the goal of improv-
ing value for both the ﬁrms’ shareholders and their own investors.
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In this monograph, we survey the academic literature on hedge fund
activism focusing on two main questions: (i) What is the nature of
activist hedge funds’ intervention in target ﬁrms? and (ii) Does hedge
fund activism create value for shareholders in the target ﬁrms and
investors in the hedge funds? Our main analyses are based on the
updated empirical evidence from an extended sample from that of Brav
et al. (2008a). The sample covers hedge fund activism events in U.S.
ﬁrms during 2001–2007. We also review work by other researchers on
both U.S. and international hedge fund activism. We refer readers inter-
ested in general shareholder activism to the survey by Gillan and Starks
(2007).
Evidence on the two questions can be summarized as follows. Hedge
fund activists tend to target “value” ﬁrms that have low valuations
compared to “fundamentals.” In addition, activist hedge funds are
more likely to target ﬁrms that have sound operating cash ﬂows, but
low (sales) growth rates, leverage, and dividend payout ratios. There-
fore, one can characterize the targets as “cash-cows” with low growth
potentials that may suﬀer from the agency problem of free cash ﬂow
(Jensen, 1986). This characterization of target ﬁrms diﬀerentiates hedge
fund activism from earlier shareholder activism, which tended to tar-
get companies that had poor operating performance. The target ﬁrms
are generally smaller than comparable ﬁrms. Hedge funds target small
ﬁrms partly because they can accumulate a signiﬁcant ownership more
easily with a given amount of capital. Related to this point, the targets
of hedge fund activism exhibit relatively high trading liquidity, insti-
tutional ownership, and analyst coverage. Essentially, these character-
istics allow the activist investors to accumulate signiﬁcant stakes in
the target ﬁrms quickly without adverse price impact, and to get more
support for their agendas from fellow sophisticated investors. Lastly,
target companies tend to have weaker shareholder rights than com-
parable ﬁrms, consistent with the argument that hedge fund activists
target poorly governed ﬁrms where the potential for value improvement
is higher.
By and large, the evidence in the literature indicates that hedge
fund activism is successful in achieving the goals of creating value for
shareholders of the target companies. The short-term average abnormal
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returns around the announcement of the intervention of hedge funds are
signiﬁcantly positive across studies, on the order of 5–10%. Moreover,
the perceived increase in ﬁrm value through hedge fund activism shows
considerable cross-sectional diﬀerences. The categories that achieve the
highest abnormal short-term returns are the sale of the target ﬁrm and
changes in business strategy. In contrast, activism targeting purely cap-
ital structure or corporate governance-related agendas earns relatively
low returns. In sum, investors perceive activism that facilitates eﬃcient
re-allocation of capital in the target ﬁrms has the highest potential for
shareholder value improvement.
Importantly, post-event long-run returns, up to multiple years, show
no reversion, indicating that the market’s initial perception about value
creation is justiﬁed. Furthermore, the targets experience improvements
in operating performance (measured by return on assets or equity) after
the activism; they also exhibit increases in CEO turnover, leverage,
and payouts, but a decrease in CEO compensation. These results are
consistent with the view that hedge fund activism adds value through
operational, ﬁnancial, and governance remedies in the target ﬁrms.
The rest of the review is organized as follows. Section 2 begins with
a brief outline of the major work reviewed in this monograph. Section 3
describes data sets on hedge fund activism. Section 4 then examines the
goals and tactics employed by hedge fund activists. Section 5 analyzes
the characteristics of ﬁrms that activist hedge funds target. In Section 6,
we address the fundamental question of whether hedge fund activism
creates value for shareholders by examining short- and long-run stock
returns, and changes in operating performance of target ﬁrms. Section 7
examines returns to investors in activist hedge funds. The ﬁnal section
concludes with remarks for future research.
2
Major Work on Hedge Fund Activism
This review covers the following four parts of research on hedge fund
activism. The ﬁrst, and most important, is on hedge fund activism in
the public companies in the United States. The most comprehensive
study in this area is conducted by Brav et al. (2008a) who examine a
sample of 1,059 hedge fund activism events over the period 2001–2006.
They analyze the objectives and tactics of the hedge fund activists,
the characteristics of targets ﬁrms, the market’s reactions to activism,
and changes in ﬁrm performance after the intervention of hedge funds.
Klein and Zur (2009) collect a sample of 151 activism events over the
period 2003–2005. They focus on confrontational hedge fund activism.
Boyson and Mooradian (2007) examine 418 hedge fund activism cases
from 1994 to 2005. Cliﬀord (2008) collects another sample of 1,902
activism cases over the period 1998–2005 and focuses on stock price
reactions and changes in operating performance. Finally, Greenwood
and Schor (2009) study the role of hedge fund activism on mergers and
acquisitions using a sample of 784 events for 138 hedge funds over the
period of 1995–2005.
Most of the aforementioned studies ﬁnd that hedge fund activism
is associated with signiﬁcantly positive abnormal stock returns around
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the announcement, as well as operational, ﬁnancial, and governance-
related improvements in target ﬁrms across events. The only exception
is Greenwood and Schor (2009) who argue that positive abnormal short-
and long-term returns are driven solely by targets that are acquired ex
post, while there is no improvement in operating performance among
surviving targets.
Second, a few papers study hedge fund activism in speciﬁc sec-
tors or categories of business. Bradley et al. (2010) analyze share-
holder activism (mostly by hedge funds) in the sector of closed-end
funds. Closed-end funds serve as an ideal laboratory for analyzing value
improvement from activism because their discount (the deviation of
actual from potential value) can be accurately measured. Bradley et al.
(2010) ﬁnd that the activism during 1988–2003 reduces the close-end
fund discounts to a half of their original level on average. Huang (2009)
examines the eﬀect of hedge funds in leveraged buyouts during 1990–
2007 and ﬁnds that hedge funds bring about a higher buyout premium
by using their hold-out power with the potential buyers. Jiang et al.
(2009) study a comprehensive sample of Chapter 11 ﬁrms from 1996
to 2007 and document an array of strategies that hedge funds adopt
in order to gain control and acquire ownership at a low cost. They
ﬁnd that the presence of a hedge fund is a driving force underlying
the changing nature of Chapter 11, such as strengthening of creditors’
rights and a more management-neutral process.
Third, the literature also sheds light on the returns to investors in
the activist hedge funds, in addition to shareholders of target com-
panies. Activist hedge funds outperform the overall market and other
types of equity-oriented hedge funds. In particular, Brav et al. (2008b)
show that activist hedge funds on average earn about 1% of monthly
excess returns over the market during the 2001–2006 period. Boyson
and Mooradian (2007) also report that activist hedge funds outperform
matched hedge funds by 3.3% annually. Gantchev (2009) estimates the
cost of launching activism and concludes that the net return is consid-
erably lower.
Finally, there are a few papers that study hedge fund activism
outside the United States. Becht et al. (2008) examine hedge fund
activism events in Europe over the period 2000–2008 and ﬁnd that
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abnormal returns around the announcement of activism are signiﬁ-
cantly positive. Mietzner and Schweizer (2008) collect ﬁlings of the
acquisition of at least 5% of the voting right of public ﬁrms in Germany
and compare the performance of hedge funds with that of private equity
funds as shareholder activists. They ﬁnd that the market perceives the
announcement of the acquisition of large stakes in target ﬁrms favor-
ably for both groups of investors. Stokman (2008) studies 94 hedge
fund activism cases in Europe from 2000 to 2007 and compares them
with similar activism events in North America (mostly in the United
States). His conclusion is generally consistent with that of other papers
on hedge fund activism in Europe.
In a clinical study, Becht et al. (2009) collect a sample of 41 com-
panies targeted by one U.K. hedge fund, the Hermes U.K. Focus
Fund, and ﬁnd that a high proportion of the interventions is success-
ful and result in substantial increases in shareholder wealth. Uchida
and Xu (2008) study 41 shareholder activism events in Japan initiated
by a U.S. hedge fund, Steel Partners, and a Japanese activist fund,
Murakami Fund. They ﬁnd that the target stocks exhibit signiﬁcantly
positive abnormal returns around the announcement of activism and
the positive abnormal returns do not revert in the long run. Overall,
the evidence from samples outside the United States are consistent
with the U.S. evidence that hedge fund activism creates value for the
shareholders of target companies.
3
Data on Hedge Fund Activism
In this section we review the approaches taken by researchers to con-
struct samples of hedge fund activism events, with a focus on U.S.
data. Since there is no centralized database for hedge fund activism the
most reliable source for such events comes from Schedule 13D ﬁlings.
Section 13(d) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act requires investors
who are beneﬁcial owners of over 5% of any class of publicly traded
securities of a company, and who have an intention to inﬂuence corpo-
rate control, to disclose their ownership and intent within 10 days of
crossing the 5% threshold.1 The Schedule 13D ﬁling is an important
source for studying hedge fund activism since it provides information
about the identity of the ﬁler, ﬁling date, ownership and its changes,
cost of purchase, and most importantly, the purpose of the investment
(from Item 4 “Purpose of Transaction”).
Brav et al. (2008a) use a top-down approach to construct a com-
prehensive sample of activism events that includes events from both
Schedule 13D ﬁlings (over 5% stakes) and events that were launched
with below 5% stakes. The list of hedge funds ﬁling a Schedule 13D is
1Large passive investors can ﬁle the Schedule 13G instead which requires less information
and allows a longer delay in disclosure.
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ﬁltered through a complete list of all 11,602 Schedule 13D ﬁlers over
the 2001–2006 period. They identify hedge fund managers based on the
names and descriptions of the ﬁler type listed in Item 2 (“Identity and
Background”) combined with Internet/news searches of the ﬁlers. The
search process results in 311 hedge funds. Next, they gather all the
Schedule 13D ﬁlings and their amendments (Schedule 13D/A) made
by the 311 hedge funds on the SEC’s EDGAR system. This process
produces 1,032 events.
To mitigate the concern that the Schedule 13D-based sample is
biased toward smaller targets because of the large amount of capital
required to acquire a more than 5% stake in a large-cap company, Brav
et al. (2008a) search Form 13Fs ﬁled with the SEC and news for cases
with below 5% stakes and identify 27 additional events. After exclud-
ing ﬁlings that involve risk arbitrage, distress ﬁnancing, and non-regular
corporations such as closed-end funds, their ﬁnal sample consists of 236
activist hedge funds and 1,059 fund-target ﬁrm pairs from 2001 to 2006,
involving 882 unique target ﬁrms. Finally, Brav et al. (2008a) rely on
a combination of information from SEC ﬁlings and news search from
Factiva for the coding of the key aspects of events, such as announce-
ment date, ownership stake, stated objectives, managerial responses,
and outcomes.
Klein and Zur (2009) begin with all Schedule 13D ﬁlings from 2003
to 2005 and verify the identity of the ﬁlers (i.e., hedge funds vs. other
types of investors) by searching fund websites and news. Then, they
restrict the sample to transactions that present an explicit activist
agenda, excluding events that only present a general agenda (e.g., stock
undervaluation). This procedure generates 101 activist hedge funds and
151 confrontational target events (and 154 events for 134 other types
of activist investors).
Cliﬀord (2008) collects a list of hedge fund activists from the Dow
Jones Newswires “CFA Weekly Summary of Key 13D Filings to the
SEC” and supplements this list of funds with additional activist hedge
funds by searching Factiva for news. Then, he conﬁrms the identities of
hedge funds by searching individual funds’ websites, the Internet, and
media reports. For this list of hedge funds, he collects all block holdings
(i.e., both active and passive blocks of investments) from 1998 to 2005
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from the SEC ﬁlings. This procedure yields 788 activist blockholder
events for 197 distinct hedge funds.
Boyson and Mooradian (2007) obtain their sample of hedge funds
from CSFB/Tremont that gathers hedge fund data directly from vol-
untarily reporting hedge fund managers. They choose this sample of
hedge funds in order to properly compare the performance of activist
hedge funds with that of other types of hedge funds in the sample.
They identify 111 activist hedge funds with an average fund size over
$10 million and at least 24 months of consecutive returns. They collect
all Schedule 13D ﬁlings by these funds from the SEC website for the
period 1994–2004. This process yields 418 unique hedge fund-target
ﬁrm pairs for 397 target ﬁrms.
Finally, Greenwood and Schor (2009) collect hedge fund activism
events from Schedule 13D ﬁlings and deﬁnitive proxy statements ﬁled
by non-management (DFAN14As).2 They restrict the sample to trans-
actions by investment managers that have ﬁled Form 13F at some
point in their history in order not to confuse corporate crosshold-
ings with activist investment.3 They determine whether an activist
is a hedge fund or not through the institutions’ websites, newspaper
articles, and the Center for International Securities and Derivatives
Markets (CISDM) hedge fund database. Their ﬁnal sample consists of
784 events initiated by 139 unique hedge funds from 1993 to 2006.
Despite the diﬀerences in sample construction the key summary
statistics for the intervention of activist hedge funds are generally
similar across the studies mentioned above. For example, Brav et al.
(2008a), Greenwood and Schor (2009), and Boyson and Mooradian
(2007) report that in about a half of the activism events, hedge funds’
intervention is motivated by general issues, such as the “undervalua-
tion” of the targets’ stocks. In such cases, funds do not state speciﬁc
objectives. Further, the studies document that corporate governance
and sales of the target’s assets are two of the most common agendas.
2Deﬁnitive proxy statements ﬁled by non-management (DFAN14As) are ﬁled with the SEC
by investors who intend to or are engaged in a proxy ﬁght with a ﬁrm’s management.
3This restriction essentially excludes Schedule 13D ﬁlings by small hedge funds because
only institutions holding more than $100 million in U.S. 13(f) securities (mostly publicly
traded equities) are required to ﬁle 13F reports.
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In addition, both Brav et al. (2008a) and Boyson and Mooradian (2007)
suggest that the duration of hedge fund activists’ investment is typically
longer than one year, implying that they are not short-term investors
as often presumed by the media.
Sources of data on hedge fund activism vary more across countries
outside the United States. Becht et al. (2009) collect their sample of
activism events in the United Kingdom using proprietary data from
one hedge fund: the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund. Mietzner and Schweizer
(2008) construct their sample from the disclosure of the acquisition
of at least 5% of shares in public ﬁrms from the German Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority. Stokman (2008) performs extensive
news/media searches to collect his sample of activism incidences in
Europe. Similarly, Uchida and Xu (2008) collect a sample of Japanese
activism events by searching Edinet’s large shareholding ﬁlings and
Nikkei Shinbun, one of the largest business newspapers in Japan, with
keywords related to the names of the two activist funds: Steel Partners
and Murakami Fund.
The data used in the analyses for the rest of the paper are a combi-
nation of two sources: data for events from 2001 to 2006 are obtained
from Brav et al. (2008a); and data for events in 2007 are hand-collected
using the same procedure and criteria. Unless otherwise stated, we use
the 5% level as the criterion for statistical signiﬁcance.
4
Characteristics of Hedge Fund Activism Events
4.1 Activist Hedge Funds’ Objectives and Tactics
Intervention by hedge fund activists in target ﬁrms involves various
objectives and tactics. Panel A of Table 4.1 summarizes the stated
objectives that the activist funds provide when they announce their
intent to intervene as well as the associated success (including partial
success) rates from 2001 to 2007. The panel classiﬁes the underly-
ing motives into the following ﬁve major categories: “general under-
valuation/maximize shareholder value,” “capital structure,” “business
strategy,” “sale of target company,” and “governance.” The objectives,
except the ﬁrst, are not mutually exclusive as one activist event can tar-
get multiple issues. An event is classiﬁed as successful if the hedge fund
achieves its main stated goal; a partial success if the hedge fund and
the company reach some settlement through negotiation that partially
meets the fund’s original goal.
The ﬁrst objective includes events in which the hedge fund believes
that the company is undervalued and/or that the fund can help
the manager maximize shareholder value. All events in this objective
involve communication with the management without more aggressive
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tactics that are publicly observed. This category represents 47.9% of
the full sample. The second category, which represents 17.4% of the
full sample, includes activism targeting ﬁrm’s payout policy and capital
structure. This category includes events in which the hedge fund pro-
poses changes geared toward the reduction of excess cash, an increase in
ﬁrm leverage, or higher payouts to shareholders. This group of events
also involves issuance of securities by the target companies, such as
modifying seasoned equity oﬀerings or proposing debt restructuring.
The third set of events includes activism targeting issues related to
business strategy, such as operational eﬃciency, business restructuring,
mergers and acquisitions, and growth strategies. This group represents
23% of all events in the full sample. The fourth category of activist
events involves activism urging the sale of the target. In this category,
hedge funds attempt either to force a sale of the target company to a
third party, or, in a small minority of the cases, to acquire the company
themselves. Partial success in this group means that the ﬁrm remains
independent, but agrees to undergo major changes.
Lastly, the ﬁfth set of events includes activism targeting corporate
governance. In this category, hedge funds attempt to rescind takeover
defenses, to oust the CEO or chairman, to challenge board indepen-
dence and fair representation, to demand more information disclosure
and question potential fraud, and to challenge the level or the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of executive compensation.
Greenwood and Schor (2009) report a similar representation of
objectives for their sample of hedge fund activism. For about a half
(45.5%) of the hedge fund activism events they study, hedge funds rec-
ognize that the target ﬁrm is “undervalued” and engage in management
to improve the value of the ﬁrm. Further, activism agendas related to
capital structure, asset sales, and corporate governance represent 11.5,
18.1, and 21.9% of their full sample, respectively.
The success rate of activism across the objectives varies. Aggregated
across both hostile and non-hostile events, hedge funds achieve com-
plete or near complete success in 31.3% of the cases, which we deﬁne
as achieving their main stated goals. In 21.1% of the cases, we observe
a partial success where hedge funds gain major concessions from their
targets; in 22.1% of the cases the funds fail or withdraw from their
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case. The remaining 25.5% of the cases in our sample are those that
are still ongoing toward the end of the sample collection, or for which
no information about outcome is available in any news service or SEC
ﬁlings. Given that targets ﬁrms often demonstrate strong tendency to
resist and ﬁght, this rate of success or partial success is impressive.
Such a rate is comparable to that reported by Ikenberry and Lakon-
ishok (1993) on outcomes of proxy contests for corporate control from
1968 to 1988. Klein and Zur (2009) and Boyson and Mooradian (2007)
report that the overall success rate of hedge fund activism in their
samples is about two-thirds.
The last row of Panel A of Table 4.1 summarizes events in cate-
gories (2) through (5) in which a goal is explicitly stated. It indicates
that hostile events, deﬁned as events that involve open confrontation
between the activists and the target management, are generally associ-
ated with lower success rates but higher partial success rates. In other
words, a middle-ground resolution through negotiation is a more likely
outcome for events with a public battle. Not surprisingly, the total
success rate (including partial success) for the hostile sample is even
higher than that for the non-hostile sample (60.6% vs. 43.9%). Need-
less to say, hedge fund tactics are endogenous, and this evidence is best
interpreted as an equilibrium outcome in which hostile tactics are most
likely adopted when the perceived resistance from the target manage-
ment is higher, or after less confrontational approaches fail (Gantchev,
2009).
Panel B of Table 4.1 provides a breakdown of the hedge funds tac-
tics in the sample from the least to most aggressive. The ﬁrst tactic
category includes events in which the hedge fund states that it intends
to communicate with the board/management on a regular basis with
the goal of enhancing shareholder value. Almost all ﬁlings in this group
do not reveal to the public any speciﬁc agenda by the hedge fund.
These cases comprise about a half (51.2%) of the sample. The second
tactic category includes events in which the hedge fund seeks board
representation without a proxy contest or confrontation with the exist-
ing management/board. The third tactic category includes cases where
the hedge fund makes formal shareholder proposals, or publicly criti-
cizes the management and demands change. Next, the fourth category
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includes events in which the hedge fund threatens to wage a proxy ﬁght
in order to gain board representation, or to sue the management for
breach of duty. The ﬁfth category is assigned to events in which the
hedge fund launches a proxy contest in order to replace the board. The
remaining two tactic groups include events in which the hedge fund
sues the company with the intention to take control of the company
(e.g., with a takeover bid). Since activist events can fall within more
than one of these categories, the percentages in the second through
seventh categories sum to more than 48.8% (the remaining 51.2% fall
in the ﬁrst group).
The subcategory of hostile activist events involves events in fourth
through seventh tactic categories, or those that fall in the third category
but involve a stated hostile intention (such as to oust the CEO). By
this criterion, there are a total of 318 such hostile cases (27.1% of the
total sample).
The large heterogeneity in fund tactics raises the question as to how
target companies respond to this rich set of tactics and what kind of
equilibrium outcomes emerge. Given that events in the ﬁrst tactic cat-
egory described above (“communication”) do not provide public and
explicit agenda, it is diﬃcult to classify target company responses and
outcome. For the remaining 611 events in which hedge funds post some
explicit agenda, we track the evolution of these events using information
from both news search and subsequent SEC ﬁlings (such as Schedule
13D/A and Schedule 14A).1 Over the course of the hedge fund’s inter-
vention, target companies choose to accommodate the activists 35.3%
of the time, to negotiate 22.3% of the time, and to ﬁght/resist 42.4%
of the time.
4.2 Activist Hedge Funds’ Investment in Target Firms
How large is hedge funds’ investment in their target companies? In this
section, we examine the percentage ownership and the value of stakes
1After the initial Schedule 13D ﬁling, the fund is required to ﬁle promptly an amended
Schedule 13D/A if there is material change in the position or other items. Schedule 14A
contains all of the information that is required to be ﬁled in an issuer’s proxy statement
that will be mailed to its shareholders prior to the company’s annual shareholders’ meeting.
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that activist hedge funds acquire in target ﬁrms. Panel A of Table 4.2
reports the size of the activists’ stakes in their target ﬁrms, both in
dollar value (at cost), and as a percentage of outstanding shares of the
target. Information in the columns denoted “Initial” comes from the
Schedule 13D ﬁling. For the non-Schedule 13D events, the information
is collected based on news media or Form 13F at the initiation of the
events. The columns labeled “Max.” provide the maximum stake that
the funds accumulated in the targets, which is retrieved from the sub-
sequent amendments to the 13D ﬁlings, or news follow-ups. The last
four columns in Panel A present this information for the subsample of
hostile events.
The median initial (maximum) percentage stake that a hedge fund
takes in the target is 6.3 (9.5)%, and the median dollar stake, at cost,
is 15.0 (24.8) million in 2007 constant dollars. We note that the hostile
cases exhibit larger ownership stakes in target ﬁrms and greater capital
commitments by the hedge funds, especially at the higher percentiles
of the sample.
An important pattern emerging from Panel A is that the activism
that we analyze does not generally involve controlling blocks. The inter-
quartile range of hedge funds’ initial stakes is from 5.3 to 8.8%, and
the 75th percentile of the maximum ownership falls below 15%. Even at
the 95th percentile of the sample, hedge funds hold 29.2% in the target
companies, considerably lower than the majority requirement. These
numbers are comparable across diﬀerent studies. For example, Boyson
and Mooradian (2007) document that the mean initial (maximum) per-
centage ownership by hedge funds in target companies is 8.8 (12.4)%.
Similarly, Greenwood and Schor (2009) report a 9.8% average initial
ownership in their sample. It therefore appears that the activist hedge
funds do not generally aim to take control of their targets. Rather,
they hope to facilitate value-enhancing changes as minority sharehold-
ers. As such, they often need to work with and win support from other
shareholders, especially on issues that require shareholder voting. These
features distinguish the activist hedge funds from the corporate raiders
in the 1980s who sought to obtain full control to internalize all the
beneﬁts from their intervention. Panel B of Table 4.2 lists the break-
down of various forms of hedge fund exit, indicating that selling in the
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Table 4.2. Hedge Funds’ Capital Commitment and Investment Horizon.
Panel A: Capital commitment (in 2007 constant dollars)
All Events Hostile Events
Invested capital
($ million) % Ownership
Invested capital
($ million) % Ownership
Percentile Initial Max. Initial Max. Initial Max. Initial Max.
5% 0.9 2.2 5.00% 5.50% 1.6 3.2 3.70% 5.60%
25% 4.3 9.0 5.31% 7.52% 5.3 10.6 5.55% 8.20%
50% 15.0 24.8 6.30% 9.50% 16.4 25.8 6.70% 9.87%
75% 46.7 79.4 8.81% 13.16% 46.6 84.5 9.02% 13.85%
95% 234.2 329.3 21.10% 29.20% 313.1 420.8 19.95% 30.10%
Panel B: Breakdown of exit
Categories Hostile Non-hostile All events
Sold shares on the open market 20.8% 32.9% 29.5%
Target company sold 11.9% 4.9% 6.8%
Target company merged into another 8.2% 4.1% 5.2%
Liquidated 1.6% 0.7% 0.9%
Shares sold back to target company 0.6% 0.4% 0.4%
Still holding/no Information 56.9% 57.0% 57.1%
Panel C: Length of Holding Period (Days) for Completed Spells
Percentile Hostile (Initial) Non-hostile (Initial) All Events
5% 11 23 22
25% 96 141 126
50% 229 285 266
75% 439 504 487
95% 840 1,273 1,235
Panel A provides the size of the hedge funds’ stakes both in terms of dollar values (at
cost), and as a percentage of the outstanding shares of the target companies. We report
the 5th, 25th, 50th (median), 75th, and 95th percentiles of the sample. The “Initial” columns
report the stakes that hedge funds take at their initial 13D ﬁlings or ﬁrst announcement
of activism. The “Max.” columns report the maximum reported stakes that the funds
accumulated in the targets as revealed from subsequent 13D/A ﬁlings or news search.
Panel B gives the breakdown of various forms of hedge fund exit. Reported in the last row
are the percentages of events that have no information about exit by the end of March
2009. Finally, Panel C lists the length of holding period (in number of days) at diﬀerent
percentiles of the sample for the subsample that has exit information. In each panel, the
statistics for the full sample and the subsample of hostile events are reported separately.
open market is the predominant form, accounting for two-thirds of all
complete spells.
Finally, activist hedge funds’ investment horizons have been an issue
of contention. Critics accuse activist funds of aiming for short-term
gains at the expense of long-term shareholder value (Kahan and Rock,
4.2 Activist Hedge Funds’ Investment in Target Firms 205
2006). Panel C of Table 4.2 shows the duration of hedge fund activists’
investment in target companies. We use multiple sources to determine
the “exit date” when the hedge fund signiﬁcantly reduces its investment
in the target company.2 First, we use the last 13D/A ﬁling to determine
when the ownership drops below the 5% disclosure threshold (i.e., the
“exit date”). When such information is not available, we use the date
when the outcome of sale of the target or the fund’s withdrawal from
the intervention is announced. Note that since the sample period is from
2001 to 2007 with many recent events still unresolved as of the close of
the data collection, the exit information is not available for 57.1% of
the cases. Focusing on the subsample of the completed events where the
information to determine the exit date is available, Panel C shows that
the median duration from the ﬁrst Schedule 13D ﬁling to divestment
is 266 days. We also ﬁnd that the average duration of investment is
376 days, which implies that the distribution of the duration is right-
skewed. The 25th and 75th percentile ﬁgures for the full sample are 126
days and 487 days, respectively. Furthermore, events that are initiated
with hostility see somewhat shorter investment horizon than the non-
hostile ones (229 vs. 285 days at the median).
The numbers reported in Panel C of Table 4.2 generally underes-
timate the unconditional duration of hedge funds’ investment in the
target companies both because they exclude investments censored at
the end of the sample period and they assume that dropping below
5% level is divestment. Using the annual portfolio turnover rates of
the activist hedge funds (based on their quarterly holdings disclosed
in their 13F ﬁlings), we ﬁnd that their average holding period of a
position is close to two years. The evidence regarding the duration of
investment is conﬁrmed by Boyson and Mooradian (2007), who show
that for hostile (non-hostile) events, the average duration of activist
hedge funds’ investment in their sample is 496 (773) days.
2See Brav et al. (2008a) for the duration of hedge fund activism when broader deﬁnitions
of exit (e.g., the hedge fund’s stake drops below 1% or $1 million) are considered.
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Characteristics of Target Companies
The next important question for hedge fund activism is: What type
of companies do activist hedge funds target? Table 5.1 reports results
for probit regressions predicting hedge funds’ targeting. The regres-
sions cover all Compustat ﬁrm-year observations from 2001 to 2007,
which include both event and non-event observations. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm-year observation
corresponds to a ﬁrm being targeted by a hedge fund during the year.
All of ﬁrm characteristics variables are from various components of
the WRDS database (including CRSP, Compustat, Thomson, IBES,
and Risk Metrics), recorded at the year-end before targeting. Since
the GINDEX, deﬁned as the number of takeover defenses that a ﬁrm
adopts according to Gompers et al. (2003), is only available for about
one-third of ﬁrms on Compustat, the multivariate regression with GIN-
DEX is reported separately (in Column 2). It is important to point out
that the subsample of ﬁrms that have GINDEX information are over-
represented by large ﬁrms and ﬁrms with higher institutional owner-
ship, and the results should therefore be interpreted accordingly.
The results from the multivariate regression are qualitatively similar
to the univariate results based on the matched-sample method reported
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in Brav et al. (2008a), where the set of matched ﬁrms for each target
company are assigned from the same year, same industry, and same
size and book-to-market sorted portfolios.
Table 5.1 reveals several interesting relations. The negative coeﬃ-
cients on market value (MV) of equity across columns indicate that the
target ﬁrms are generally smaller than the non-target ﬁrms. This result
is robust and consistent with many other studies including Klein and
Zur (2009), Greenwood and Schor (2009), Cliﬀord (2008), Boyson and
Mooradian (2007), and Mietzner and Schweizer (2008). Larger ﬁrms are
less likely to be targeted by hedge funds possibly because of the large
amount of capital a hedge fund would need to invest in order to amass
a meaningful stake. Moreover, acquiring a sizeable stake in a large ﬁrm
might introduce inordinate amount of idiosyncratic risk for an activist
hedge fund given that the median activist fund in our sample manages
less than $1 billion of assets.
The signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the valuation variable, q (deﬁned as
(book value of debt + market value of equity)/(book value of debt +
book value of equity)), indicate that the activist hedge funds resem-
ble “value investors.” This result suggests that activist hedge funds
attempt to identify undervalued companies where the potential for
improvement is high. In fact, in about two-thirds of the cases, the
hedge fund explicitly states that it believes the target is undervalued.
To the extent that activist hedge funds proﬁt from the improvement
of the companies’ operations and strategies, it is also important that
hedge funds target companies whose stock prices have yet to reﬂect the
potential for improvement.
Target ﬁrms tend to be low-growth ﬁrms but signiﬁcantly more
proﬁtable than comparable ﬁrms, in terms of annual sales growth
(GROWTH) and return on assets (ROA, deﬁned as the ratio of
EBITDA to lagged assets). This evidence is important as it sets apart
hedge fund activism from earlier institutional activism targeting poorly
performing companies (Gillan and Starks, 2007). Note that although
Column 2 shows that the coeﬃcient on ROA is insigniﬁcantly negative,
we interpret the results in Columns 1 and 5 as more representative of
the full sample because the regression in Column 2 is over-represented
by large ﬁrms.
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The next set of variables concern capital structure. Target ﬁrms
have higher leverage: the coeﬃcient on book value debt-to-capital ratio
(LEV) is signiﬁcantly positive both in univariate and multivariate
regressions. Target ﬁrms’ dividend payout is signiﬁcantly lower relative
to peers, as measured by the dividend yield (DIVYLD, deﬁned as (com-
mon dividend)/(market value of common stocks)). Combined with the
results regarding ROA and DIVYLD, we conclude that target ﬁrms do
generate cash ﬂow but are reluctant to payout to investors, a symptom
of the agency problem of free cash ﬂow according to Jensen (1986).
The characteristics of target ﬁrms mentioned above (i.e., they have
low valuations, growth rates, and payout ratios) are consistent across
diﬀerent studies. In particular, Boyson and Mooradian (2007) report
that the target ﬁrms have a lower Tobin’s q, sales growth rate, pay-
out ratio, and dividend yield compared to the industry/size/book-to-
market matched ﬁrms. In addition, they ﬁnd that the targets have
higher operating proﬁtability in terms of ROA and cash ﬂow than the
matched ﬁrms. Cliﬀord (2008) also ﬁnds that the ﬁrms in the active
blocks have higher ROA and ROE, but lower market-to-book and lever-
age ratios than those in the passive blocks. Overall, these characteristics
suggest that hedge fund activists target companies that have stable but
undervalued businesses generating sound cash ﬂows, rather than ﬁrms
that have either operational problems or uncertain business prospects.
On the investment side, target ﬁrms spend less than their peers
on research and development, scaled by lagged assets (RND) (how-
ever, the statistical signiﬁcance is weak for multivariate regressions in
columns 1 and 2). This result is conﬁrmed by Boyson and Mooradian
(2007), who report that target ﬁrms have lower R&D expenditures than
matched ﬁrms at the median. The univariate analysis in Column 9 indi-
cates that target ﬁrms appear to have slightly lower Herﬁndahl indices
(HERFINDAHL, measured as the Herﬁndahl index of sales in diﬀerent
business segments as reported by Compustat), suggesting that they are
more diversiﬁed than their peers. However, the signiﬁcance becomes
weak in multivariate regressions and thus the evidence on business
diversiﬁcation is largely inconclusive.
Based on univariate regressions, targets also have signiﬁ-
cantly higher institutional ownership (INST) and analyst coverage
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(ANALYST) than their peers. However, the sign of the coeﬃcient
on analyst coverage turns negative in multivariate regressions in
Columns 1 and 2 mainly due to its collinearity with institutional own-
ership and the measure of illiquidity as per Amihud (2002) (AMI-
HUD). Both institutional ownership and analyst coverage proxy for
shareholder sophistication. This is an important factor for activist
hedge funds because they often rely on the understanding and sup-
port from fellow shareholders in order to implement the changes,
given their minority stakes in the target ﬁrms (see Table 4.2). Since
the latter two variables could also proxy for trading liquidity we
use a direct trading liquidity measure, the Amihud (2002) illiq-
uidity measure (AMIHUD). It is deﬁned as the yearly average of
1000
√|Return|/(Dollar Trading Volume), using daily data. We ﬁnd
that target companies exhibit higher trading liquidity than compara-
ble ﬁrms (i.e., negative coeﬃcients on the illiquidity measure). High
liquidity makes it easier for the activists to accumulate a stake within
a short period of time without incurring adverse market impact.
Related to the eﬀect of liquidity on targeting of hedge fund activists,
a recent paper by Norli et al. (2009) provides additional evidence
that stock market liquidity facilitates intervention by activist investors.
Using a sample of 507 contested proxy solicitations and shareholder pro-
posals from 1994 to 2007, they ﬁnd that liquid ﬁrms (i.e., those having
above-median liquidity) have a 50% higher likelihood of being targeted
by activist investors than illiquid ﬁrms (i.e., those having below-median
liquidity). Their evidence is consistent with the theoretical model of
Maug (1998), in which liquidity mitigates the free-rider problem in
costly monitoring of managers because activist blockholders can com-
pensate for their monitoring costs through the increased trading proﬁts
due to high liquidity.1
Next, we turn to governance characteristics measured by the Gom-
pers et al. (2003) governance index (GINDEX). The GINDEX tracks
24 takeover defenses that ﬁrms can adopt, as well as the laws of the
state in which the targets are incorporated. Target ﬁrms tend to have
1Theory does not prescribe a clear-cut relation between shareholder intervention and stock
liquidity. See Coﬀee (1991), Bhide (1993), and Kahn and Winton (1998) for models that
predict the opposite (i.e., discouraging) eﬀect of liquidity on shareholder activism.
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more takeover defenses (or weaker shareholder rights). The eﬀect of
GINDEX on the probability of targeting is highly signiﬁcant both for
multivariate and univariate regressions.
Characteristics of target ﬁrms in activism events outside the United
States are broadly consistent with those in the United States. Uchida
and Xu (2008) show that targets of hedge fund activism in Japan tend
to have lower market-to-book ratios (i.e., “value”) and leverage than
matched ﬁrms. For activist events in the United Kingdom, Becht et al.
(2009) report that the factor loadings of the U.K. Hermes Focus Fund
on Fama and French factors SMB and HML are positive, suggesting
that the target companies in the fund’s portfolio are characterized as
value and small ﬁrms.
In summary, the characteristics of target ﬁrms suggest that the
potential problems that hedge funds identify tend to be issues that are
generalizable to all ﬁrms, such as changes in governance and payout
policies, rather than issues that are speciﬁc to individual target ﬁrms,
such as slump in sales. Targeted ﬁrms do not seem to suﬀer from serious
operational diﬃculties. Rather, they are actually proﬁtable and enjoy
sound cash ﬂows, as indicated by the signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients
on ROA in Table 5.1. The potential problems that these companies
face are likely related to the agency problem of free cash ﬂows, such as
relatively low dividend payout and diversifying investments that might
not be in the best interest of shareholders.
These targeting patterns seem sensible given that hedge funds are,
in general, not experts in the speciﬁc business of the ﬁrms they invest
in. Focusing on issues that are generalizable to other potential target
ﬁrms helps to lower the marginal cost of launching activism on a new
company (Black, 1990). Another reason to avoid targeting an idiosyn-
cratic ﬁrm issue is oﬀered by Kahn and Winton (1998). Their theory
predicts that investors are more likely to intervene in well-understood
ﬁrms or industries so that the market can appreciate the eﬀects of
intervention. And they should avoid “opaque” and complicated busi-
ness, such as those involved with high R&D, in order to avoid delay in
the resolution (in the market price) of the intervention’s impact. Our
data as well as those in Boyson and Mooradian (2007) oﬀer support
to this hypothesis (i.e., the target ﬁrms have lower R&D expenditures
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than the peer ﬁrms). We do not wish to over-interpret this relation
because the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant in Table 5.1 when the full set of
covariates is controlled for. We note, however, that q, sales growth, and
ROA are also indirect proxies for technology intensity, and they are all
statistically signiﬁcant in predicting activist targeting. The combined
evidence is therefore consistent with the predictions in Black (1990)
and Kahn and Winton (1998).
6
Does Hedge Fund Activism
Create Value for Shareholders?
The fundamental question for hedge fund activism is whether it
achieves the stated goal of creating value for shareholders. We address
this question by examining both short-run stock returns around the
announcement of activism as well as subsequent long-run returns. This
analysis addresses how the stock market perceives the eﬀect of hedge
fund activism on shareholder value ex ante and whether the long-run
measures are consistent with the market’s perception.
6.1 Event-Day Returns Around the
Announcement of Activism
We adopt both short- and long-run event windows around the
announcement of activism events. Figure 6.1 plots the average buy-
and-hold return, in excess of the buy-and-hold return on the value-
weight NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index from CRSP, from 20 days prior
to the event date to 20 days afterward for all events from 2001 to 2007.
The event date is deﬁned as the Schedule 13D ﬁling date if available, or
the ﬁrst announcement of targeting if the hedge fund ownership stake
is lower than 5% (and hence no Schedule 13D was ﬁled). There is a run
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Fig. 6.1 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return around the Announcement of Activism. The solid
line (left axis) plots the average buy-and-hold return around the announcement date, in
excess of the buy-and-hold return of the value-weight market, from 20 days prior the event
date to 20 days afterwards. The bars (right axis) plot the increase (in percentage points) in
the share trading turnover during the same time window compared to the average turnover
rate during the preceding [−100, −40] event window.
up of about 2.6% between 10 days to 1 day prior to ﬁling. The ﬁling
day and the following day see an increase of 1.0 and 1.2%, respectively.
Afterward the abnormal return keeps trending up to a total of 6.0% in
20 days.
The magnitude of the announcement-window abnormal returns
is comparable with those in other studies on U.S. activism events.
Klein and Zur (2009) report that the average abnormal return
(over the market) is 7.2% for the [−30,+30] window around the
announcement day. Cliﬀord (2008) and Boyson and Mooradian (2007)
also document signiﬁcantly positive average abnormal announcement-
day returns ranging from 3.4 to 8.1% for various event windows.
Greenwood and Schor (2009) show that the average abnormal return
for the [−10,+5] window is 3.6% for their sample and it is highest for
events related to asset sales and block mergers for the target ﬁrm.
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The stock market’s reaction to the disclosure of activist funds’
engagement in a target outside the United States is broadly consis-
tent with the U.S. experience. Becht et al. (2009) report that in the
United Kingdom, the mean abnormal return over the [−5,+5] window
around the announcement of activism outcomes is 3.94%. Moreover,
they ﬁnd that the announcement of CEO and chairman turnover and
restructuring is associated with particularly high returns. Similarly,
Becht et al. (2008) document that the average cumulative abnormal
return around the [−25,+25] announcement-day window is about 6.0%
for their sample of activism events in Europe. Stokman (2008) also
reports a similar magnitude of abnormal returns for European cases: the
average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during the [−25,+25] win-
dow of 12.2%. For activism events in Germany, Mietzner and Schweizer
(2008) report the average abnormal return of 6.24% for the [−20,+20]
window around the announcement of activists’ acquisition of stakes.
For Japan, Uchida and Xu (2008) document the average excess return
of 5.6% for the [−2,+2] window around the announcement of activist
events. Overall, the evidence suggests that investors perceive hedge
fund activism as value-enhancing.
Figure 6.1 also shows the average abnormal trading volume over the
event window. The abnormal volume is deﬁned as the share turnover
rate over the “normal” turnover rate measured over the [−100,−40]
window preceding the event date. The spike in abnormal trading vol-
ume does not occur on the event day but rather during the 10-day
period before the announcement. The 10-day lead seems no coincident
with the fact that investors are required to ﬁle Schedule 13D no later
than 10-days after the transaction that causes them to go over the 5%
threshold. Therefore, it is possible that the ﬁling fund may be engaging
in additional buying prior to the announcement of activism.1
It is important to note that the market reactions are not an unbi-
ased estimate of expected beneﬁts from ex post successful activism.
1There are two alternative explanations for the abnormal volume in the days preceding the
ﬁling date. The ﬁrst is “wolf pack” investing, in which several hedge funds, who do not
formally coordinate, buy into the target ﬁrm; and the other is “tipping,” where the lead
hedge fund reveals its intention to a small number of investors before the public ﬁling for
reciprocation of other favors.
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Rather, market prices reﬂect the beneﬁt of intervention adjusted for
the equilibrium probability that the hedge fund continues with activism
and succeeds, and hence underestimate the value of ex post successful
activism.2 Moreover, the raw correlation between ex post success and
announcement returns is low. This low predictability of success, from
the perspective of outside market participants, is consistent with the
theoretical models of Maug (1998) and Cornelli and Li (2002) and the
empirical evidence in Bradley et al. (2010).
By breaking Figure 6.1 into event years, Figure 6.2 shows that the
average abnormal return during the [−20,+20] window is higher for the
early sample years than later. The average abnormal event-day return
is almost 14% on average in 2001, but it decreases to less than 4% in
2006–2007. This decline may be driven by competition just like any
other investment strategy: hedge funds’ activist “arbitrage” strategy
intensiﬁed over the years, leading to the entry of more players into the
ﬁeld, which in turn reduced the equilibrium returns to activism.
Fig. 6.2 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return by Event Year. Average buy-and-hold return dur-
ing the event window (as deﬁned in Figure 6.1) in excess of the buy-and-hold return of the
value-weight market for diﬀerent groups of events classiﬁed by the event year, from 2001
to 2007. The rightmost bar presents the average abnormal buy-and-hold return of the full
sample.
2See Bond et al. (2010) for a theoretical analysis of a general model on how prices anticipate
corrective actions that are based on these prices.
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Equally important as the average abnormal return is its cross-
sectional variation since it reﬂects the heterogeneity in market
perceptions regarding the expected value generated by activism. To
explore the cross-sectional variation in market response to shareholder
activism, we run regressions with the dependent variable being the
abnormal return in the [−20,+20] window around the event date.
Included as covariates are dummy variables for the ﬁve broad stated
objectives classiﬁed in Section 4.1, the logarithm of market capitaliza-
tion, the leverage ratio (the ratio of debt to sum of debt and market
value of equity), a dummy variable equal to one if the hedge fund
revealed signiﬁcant stake in the target company in its 13F ﬁlings before
the event, and the average [−20,+20] window abnormal return for all
the previous events led by the same hedge fund.
From the regression (not reported), we learn that activism that
aims at the sale of the target generates the highest abnormal return,
with the average abnormal return of 8.54%. This result is consistent
with the evidence in Greenwood and Schor (2009) who report that
the abnormal return is the highest for the events in which targets are
acquired subsequently. Becht et al. (2008) document a similar diﬀerence
in average abnormal returns between acquired and non-acquired targets
(8.1% vs. 5.2%) for their sample of activism events in Europe. Business
strategy related activism also generates a signiﬁcant abnormal return
of 5.95%.
On the other hand, though activism targeting capital structure and
governance issues also generates somewhat positive average returns
(1.47 and 1.73%), these estimates are not statistically distinguish-
able from zero. The latter estimates are consistent with the weak
return eﬀects documented by prior literature on traditional governance-
oriented activism.3 Similarly, Becht et al. (2008) show that the
announcement of board turnover outcomes produces abnormal returns
close to zero. However, these results contrast with the evidence in
Boyson and Mooradian (2007), who report that governance-related
hedge fund activism is associated with the most favorable stock market
3One exception is Bizjak and Marquette (1998), who document some value improvement
from shareholder resolution to rescind poison pills.
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reaction. Thus, the evidence on the market’s perception of governance-
related activism is mixed.
Finally, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant but economically small eﬀect of a hedge
fund’s track record (proxied by the average announcement returns from
the hedge fund’s previous interventions) on market reactions. Related
to this point, Zur (2008) suggests that the reputation for being suc-
cessful in previous activism events can account for some of the cross-
sectional diﬀerences in the Schedule 13D announcement premium.
6.2 Long-Term Returns to Targets of
Hedge Fund Activism
Alternative explanations for the high abnormal event-day return exam-
ined in the previous section that refute value creation include a tempo-
rary price impact caused by buying pressure from the lead hedge fund
or their followers, and market over-reaction. As shown in Figure 6.1,
the run up in price around the announcement window is accompa-
nied by abnormally high trading volume as well. If the price impact
is purely temporary and reﬂects a trading friction rather than infor-
mation about prospective value changes, we should observe negative
abnormal returns shortly after the event. This turns out not to be the
case in our data. Figure 6.1 shows no reversal after 20 days (when the
abnormal turnover declines to close to zero), and the pattern persists
if we extend the window for another 20 days.
We conduct a more formal long-term return analysis, reported in
Table 6.1, using calendar-time monthly portfolio regressions around
the event date. For example, a [−3,−1] portfolio is formed by buying
the stocks of all ﬁrms that will be targeted by a hedge fund within
three months’ time, and the positions are held for three months before
being sold. For each such portfolio we estimate a regression of the
portfolio returns on the Fama–French market (RMRF), size (SMB),
book-to-market (HML) factors, and the momentum (MOM) factors.
We then focus on the regression intercept, the alpha estimate, as evi-
dence for abnormal returns and possible mean reversion. The results
are reported in Panels A and B of Table 6.1, using equal- and value-
weighting schemes, respectively.
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The factor loadings in both Panels A and B indicate that targeted
companies co-move with small and value ﬁrms, consistent with the
results on the characteristics of the targets presented in Section 5 and
Table 5.1. Target ﬁrms have a slightly sub-par pre-event stock perfor-
mance (i.e., negative alphas). But the negative alphas are only signiﬁ-
cant in the value-weighting speciﬁcation, implying that it takes larger
stock return underperformance for large-cap ﬁrms to be targeted. The
event month sees quite robust positive abnormal returns. With equal
weighting, the event month window alpha is 5.04% (signiﬁcant at less
than the 1% level). The same number for value-weighting is somewhat
lower (3.30%) but is also statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Pre-
sumably, the larger ﬁrms in the sample do not receive as a favorable
response from the market as the smaller targets, but they still earn
signiﬁcant event-month returns.
These results are comparable to those in Cliﬀord (2008), who also
runs calendar-time portfolio regressions for the target ﬁrms in his
sample. For windows of [0,+12], [0,+24], and [0,+36], he ﬁnds that
the average three- and four-factor alphas range from 1.0 to 1.9% per
month and that they are statistically signiﬁcant. In addition, he obtains
loadings on the RMRF, SMB, HML, and MOM factors for the target
portfolios that are very similar to those in Table 6.1.
Greenwood and Schor (2009) use a diﬀerent event-time regression
approach to estimate the long-term abnormal returns for target ﬁrms.
They ﬁrst estimate the loadings on the Fama–French three factors
based on returns for the 24 months prior to the activism and then
use the estimated loadings to compute abnormal monthly returns (i.e.,
alphas) for the months after the event. They report that the cumulative
abnormal returns for the [−1,+18] window is over 10% on average and
most of the returns accrue during the [+3,+18] window. These num-
bers are broadly consistent with results in Table 6.1 as well as those in
Cliﬀord (2008). However, Greenwood and Schor (2009) further argue
that hedge fund activism appears to create value only when the target
is acquired ex post based on their result that the alpha is signiﬁcantly
positive only on the subsample of targets that are eventually acquired.
Given that an event-time portfolio that is conditional on ex post infor-
mation (i.e., whether the target is acquired) is not implementable, it is
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hard to compare their conclusion directly with those in other studies, in
which implementable calendar–time portfolio strategies are examined
and only ex ante information is used to explain long-term returns.
Using evidence from Japan, Uchida and Xu (2008) conﬁrm that tar-
gets of hedge fund activism earn positive long-term abnormal returns.
They ﬁnd that alphas from calendar–time portfolio regressions for one
year after the event month are positive for both of the funds they study
(i.e., Steel Partners Japan and Murakami Fund), and most of the alphas
are statistically signiﬁcant.
Overall, the evidence in the literature suggests that the alphas
around event time are positive for targets of hedge fund activism, and
the positive abnormal returns do not revert up to a year after the ini-
tiation of activism. Therefore, the evidence clearly refutes the market
over-reaction hypothesis and supports the hypothesis that hedge fund
activism creates value for shareholders.
6.3 Performance of Target Firms Before and After Activism
If hedge fund activism creates shareholder value by intervening in the
target ﬁrms, one would expect improvements in terms of operating
performance, capital structures, and corporate governance after the
intervention. This section reviews the evidence on the change in
companies post-targeting along various measures of corporate policy
and performance. Results are reported in Table 6.2. More speciﬁcally,
we conduct the following regression in the panel data of all Compustat
ﬁrms from 1999 to 2008:
yi,t =
2∑
j=−2
γi,jDi,j + β ln(MVi,t) + αSIC3 + αyear + εi,t, (6.1)
where yi,t is a measure of performance for ﬁrm i in year t, Di,j is a
dummy variable equals to one if ﬁrm i was (will be) under hedge fund
targeting j years (j = −2,−1,0,+1,+2) relative to the current year,
and ln(MVi,t) is the log of market value of equity for ﬁrm i in time t.
Finally, αSIC3 and αyear control for industry (three-digit SIC code)
and year ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. Essentially, the default category
in the regression is “non-event ﬁrm-year observations,” and hence the
γj coeﬃcient could be interpreted as the abnormal performance of an
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event ﬁrm during j years relative to the event year, compared to the
normal levels of non-event ﬁrms. The control variables eﬀectively form
the matched sample for target ﬁrms based on the industry, year, and
ﬁrm size.
Column 1 in Panel A of Table 6.2 reports estimates of the regres-
sion in Equation (6.1) when the dependent variable is ROA (return
on assets, deﬁned as EBITDA/lagged assets), which measures oper-
ating proﬁtability. The positive coeﬃcient estimates on the dummy
variables γj (for all j) indicate that targeted companies generally have
higher operating proﬁtability than their industry/year/size matched
peers in terms of ROA. However, their performance deteriorates dur-
ing the event year (i.e., the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable becomes
insigniﬁcant), and roughly recovers to the pre-event level two years
after the event, and hence the diﬀerence between t − 1 and t + 2 is
close to zero.
Column 2 conﬁrms that activist targets are value ﬁrms that have
lower q compared to their peer ﬁrms, consistent with the character-
istic of targets discussed in Section 5. Thus, the coeﬃcients on the
dummy variables γj are signiﬁcantly negative across j. However, the
target ﬁrms experience an improvement in valuation after the inter-
vention of activist hedge funds. The diﬀerences in q between t − 1 and
t + 1 and between t − 1 and t + 2 are economically large (0.17 and
0.23, respectively) and statistically signiﬁcant (at the 10 and 5% levels,
respectively). This result suggests that hedge fund activists are gener-
ally successful in improving the valuation of undervalued target ﬁrms.
The change in payout policies occurs sooner with the hedge fund
intervention. Given that activist hedge funds often demand both divi-
dends and share repurchases, a total payout measure is suitable for our
analysis. We deﬁne the total payout yield as (dividend + share repur-
chase)/(lagged market value of equity). Column 3 in Panel A shows that
payout increases during the year of intervention, and peaks in the year
afterward. Compared to the level in the pre-event year, target ﬁrms’
average total payout yield increases by 0.1–0.2 percentage points in the
post-event years, although the changes are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Column 4 shows that the initiation of dividends increases during the
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year after the event, with a 1.2 percentage point signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in the probability of initiation between t − 1 and t + 1.
Column 5 reports the change in net leverage (deﬁned as total
debt minus cash holdings scaled by book assets). In two years, the
net leverage ratio increases by 1.0–1.3 percentage points compared to
the level in the year before the event. However, the changes are not
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. This moderate increase
in leverage is consistent with the results discussed later in Section 6.4
that expropriation of debt holders is unlikely to be a signiﬁcant source
of shareholder gains.
Several other studies provide similar evidence on the eﬀect of hedge
fund activism on targets’ performance and policies. Boyson and Moora-
dian (2007) show that one year after the intervention of activist hedge
funds, target ﬁrms exhibit increases in ROA, cash ﬂow, Tobin’s q, and
payout but a decrease in cash holdings. Cliﬀord (2008) provides addi-
tional evidence that ﬁrms targeted by activist hedge funds experience
increases in operating proﬁtability (i.e., ROA and ROE), leverage, and
dividend yield, but a decrease in cash levels. Similarly, Klein and Zur
(2009) document that one year after the intervention, target companies
decrease their cash balances and increase leverage and dividend payout.
In addition, evidence in Kim (2009) suggests that after the intervention
of activist hedge funds, managers of the target ﬁrms are less involved
with self-interested overinvestment using ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow compared to
the pre-event period. Collectively, the evidence in these studies broadly
supports the hypothesis that hedge fund activism enhances ﬁrm per-
formance by reducing agency costs associated with free cash ﬂow and
by subjecting managers to increased discipline.
Becht et al. (2009) provide another type of evidence on the improved
performance and eﬃciency in target ﬁrms after the U.K. fund’s inter-
vention. They ﬁnd that the target ﬁrms experience decreases in total
assets and numbers of employees but an increase in return on assets
during the events. This result suggests that the activist fund facilitates
active restructuring and slack-cutting in the target ﬁrms. In addition,
they ﬁnd an increase in the valuation of the targets (i.e., the market-
to-book ratio) after the intervention compared to the year prior to the
fund’s engagement.
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Turning to the ﬁnancial strength of target ﬁrms, Columns 6 and 7 in
Panel A of Table 6.2 present results on the changes in Altman’s (1968)
Z-score (ALTMAN) and distance to default (DtD). Altman’s Z-score
is widely used in the literature as a proxy for the bankruptcy risk.
Although the overall credit worthiness of the targeted ﬁrms measured
by Z-score improves in years after the intervention compared to the
year prior to the event, the changes are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Distance to default (DtD) measures the number of standard devi-
ation decreases in the ﬁrm value before it fails the debt obligations
(i.e., the ﬁrm is in default) based on Merton’s (1974) bond-pricing
model. Column 7 shows that the targets experience improvements in
the safety of debt claims from the event year to two years after the
event. Moreover, the diﬀerences between the post-event years and the
year prior to activism are highly signiﬁcant. Overall, the results suggest
that the credit worthiness of debt claims issued by the target companies
improves after the intervention of activist hedge funds.
Aslan and Maraachlian’s (2009) study provides additional evidence
on the wealth eﬀect of hedge fund activism on debt holders of tar-
get ﬁrms. They show that the bonds of target ﬁrms earn signiﬁcantly
positive abnormal returns around the announcement of activism. How-
ever, they ﬁnd that the target bonds signiﬁcantly underperform their
benchmark from the year after the activism by 3–5% per year. More-
over, the target ﬁrms have a higher likelihood of downgrading in their
credit ratings compared to their peer ﬁrms. This negative wealth eﬀect
on bondholders is more pronounced for bonds that have weak covenant
protection or investment restrictions. Nonetheless, Aslan and Maraach-
lian (2009) conclude that combining the (positive) short-term and (neg-
ative) long-term eﬀects of hedge fund activism on creditors’ wealth,
the net eﬀect does not appear to be a signiﬁcant source of gains for
shareholders.
It is worth pointing out that results in Table 6.2 are subject to
potential selection eﬀect because the ex post performance analysis can
only be performed on ﬁrms that remain in the sample in post-event
years. Within two years after being targeted by hedge funds, 18.6% of
the targets cease to be covered by Compustat (a proxy for delisting),
a rate that almost doubles the average attrition rate of Compustat
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ﬁrms. We thus face the challenge to address the potentially non-random
attrition of target ﬁrms. While ﬁrm delisting is generally associated
with negative reasons (Shumway, 1997), the speciﬁcity of our sample
indicates that ﬁrm attrition due to targeting is actually more likely to
represent a successful outcome of hedge fund activism. First, the “sale
of the company” category sees the highest attrition rate (31.0%), where
the successful sale of a target ﬁrm reﬂects the stated goal of the hedge
fund. Second, Table 5.1 shows that target companies have stronger
fundamentals (higher ROA and liquidity) than peer ﬁrms. As a result,
the subsequent attrition is less likely due to distress compared to ﬁrms
delisted without the involvement of hedge funds. Therefore the ex post
performance analysis does not necessarily induce a positive bias when
based on surviving ﬁrms only.
Section 6.4 below provides a detailed discussion on the issue of sep-
arating treatment eﬀects from selection eﬀect. In the current setting,
we formally address the issue of sample selection in the post-event sam-
ple by re-examining the regression in Equation (6.1) using Heckman’s
(1979) two-step procedure. More speciﬁcally, we estimate the following
system sequentially:
Attrition∗i = Xiβ + Ziγ + εi, (6.2a)
Attritioni = 1, if Attrition∗i > 0; Attritioni = 0, otherwise, (6.2b)
∆yi = λXi + δH(Xiβ + Ziγ) + ωi, (6.2c)
where Attrition∗i is a latent variable for the propensity of attrition for
ﬁrm i from the sample post-targeting, and Attritioni is the observed
binary outcome. ∆yi is the change in a performance measure of ﬁrm i.
Xi is a set of independent variables including major ﬁrm characteris-
tics measured during the year before targeting, and Zi represents the
instrumental variable that aﬀects the propensity of attrition but bears
no direct relation to performance. H(.) is the hazard function or the
inverse Mill’s ratio. Finally, εi and ωi are random disturbances which
are distributed as bivariate normal.
Equation (6.2a) applies to the full sample (including ﬁrms that cease
to be listed post-targeting), and we estimate the equation using probit.
The estimated coeﬃcients β and γ are used to form the hazard function
H(.), which is used as an additional regressor in Equation (6.2c) which
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only applies to the ﬁrms that remain in the sample post-targeting.
If the estimate of the coeﬃcient on H(.) is positive (negative), then it
implies that ﬁrms with higher propensity for attrition also tend to have
greater (smaller) improvement in ex post performance. As a result, a
performance regression without controlling for attrition would under-
(over-)state the eﬀect of hedge fund activism.
In general, the system of Equations (6.2a)–(6.2c) is identiﬁed by
the non-linearity of the inverse Mill’s ratio under the joint normality
of the error terms (εi and ωi), because to the extent that the inverse
Mill’s ratio is not linear, the regressors in Equation (6.2c) would not be
collinear. Thus, the existence of instrumental variables (Zi) in Equa-
tion (6.2a) (i.e., exclusion restrictions) is not a strict requirement for
identiﬁcation. However, given that the inverse Mill’s ratio is roughly
linear in parts of its domain in practice (Li and Prabhala, 2007), the
need for instrumental variables arises to properly identify the system.
We therefore use the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, which cap-
tures the target companies’ stock trading liquidity before the inter-
vention, as the instrumental variable (Zi) to identify the system of
Equations (6.2a)–(6.2c). This instrument presumably aﬀects the prob-
ability of attrition but does not appear in the second equation. A large
literature identiﬁes liquidity as a prime beneﬁt for ﬁrms to go or to
remain public. The hedge funds in our sample also often cite lack of
trading liquidity as a reason for the sales of the targets. Therefore, the
measure should have explanatory power over whether the target ﬁrms
remain as stand-alone public ﬁrms (and hence continue to be covered
by CRSP/Compustat). On the other hand, there is no a priori reason
for trading liquidity to aﬀect ﬁrms’ operating performance directly. In
fact, if trading liquidity matters for ﬁrm operating performance, the
eﬀect must go through the channel of public listing. Therefore, the
instrumental variable satisﬁes the exclusion criterion.
Panel B of Table 6.2 presents estimation results for Heckman’s two-
step procedure in Equation (6.2a)–(6.2c). We examine changes in three
performance measures between one year prior to and one year after
the activism: ROA, total payout yield (PAYYLD), and distance to
default (DtD). The coeﬃcient on the inverse Mill’s ratio in the ROA
system is signiﬁcantly positive (t−statistic = 2.33), indicating that the
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magnitude of an improvement in ROA in Column 1 of Panel A is
underestimated because ﬁrms that have higher a propensity for attri-
tion also have a better prospect in ROA. On the other hand, there is
no evidence of selection bias for payout yield and distance to default
because the coeﬃcients on both inverse Mill’s ratios are far from sig-
niﬁcant (t−statistic = 0.25 and −0.47, respectively).
This result sheds light on the interpretation of ex post performance
analysis for target companies of hedge fund activism. If anything, the
eﬀect of hedge fund activism on operating performance of target ﬁrms
is more likely to have been underestimated in various studies. In partic-
ular, Greenwood and Schor (2009) argue that hedge fund activism does
not appear to create long-term value because the measures of perfor-
mance (such as ROA) do not improve signiﬁcantly after the interven-
tion among surviving ﬁrms. However, given the potential negative bias
in the estimate of changes in ROA due to the sample selection eﬀect,
their ﬁnding on the weak eﬀect of activism on performance might be
partially driven by the selection bias because ﬁrms that get acquired
due to activist intervention tend to be better-than-average in quality
or have less entrenched management.
Returning to Panel A, Columns 8–10 examine the eﬀect of hedge
fund activism on executives. Column 8 classiﬁes an event as CEO
turnover if the name of the CEO of a company is diﬀerent from that
in the prior year in the ExecuComp database. The result shows that
one year after targeting, the turnover rate among the (surviving) target
companies increases signiﬁcantly compared to one year prior to inter-
vention, with a jump of 5.5 percentage points. Moreover, the estimates
used here underestimate CEO turnover since they do not include CEO
departures as a result of liquidation or sale of the company.
In Column 9, the variable is the total CEO compensation including
salary, bonus, and stock and option grants (“TDC1” by ExecuComp).
The value of the last component is measured at the time of grant and
therefore the variable is an ex ante measure of total CEO compensation,
which is usually contracted during the year prior to the year in which
they are paid. The CEO compensation at target ﬁrms was higher than
that of the peers up to the event year (signiﬁcant at the 10% level).
However, it decreases in the years after the activism (the diﬀerences are
230 Does Hedge Fund Activism Create Value for Shareholders?
statistically insigniﬁcant), becoming indistinguishable from peer levels
one year after hedge fund targeting. A related pattern is the increase
in pay-for-performance sensitivity shown in Column 10, measured as
the percentage of CEO’s total compensation that comes from equity-
based incentives (including both shares and options): targeted ﬁrms
experience a signiﬁcant increase in pay-for-performance two years after
the event year compared to the year before the event.
Overall, hedge funds are successful in curtailing executive compen-
sation, enhancing pay-for-performance, and ousting CEOs. And such
actions seem to be much more widespread than implied by hedge funds’
publicly stated objectives: in only 5.6 and 4.7% of all activism events
hedge funds openly request CEOs to step down or to cut their pay.
Therefore, we believe that hedge funds carry out governance-related
agenda more often than their public statements indicate (as summa-
rized in Table 4.1).
To summarize, hedge fund activism has been successful in improving
operating performance, increasing payouts, and reducing agency costs.
It is associated with an almost immediate increase in payout and height-
ened discipline of the CEO. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) show
that there is large heterogeneity across diﬀerent blockholders in their
eﬀect on corporate decisions along similar dimensions, but the average
eﬀect is small and insigniﬁcant.4 Our results contribute to the litera-
ture by showing that one small group of block holders — activist hedge
funds — are eﬀective at inﬂuencing corporate policies and enhancing
corporate governance.
6.4 Value Creation, Stock Picking, or Wealth Transfer?
The most important alternative hypothesis for the positive market reac-
tions to hedge fund activism is that hedge fund activists simply identify
undervalued companies and alert the market to this possibility, but do
not add to the ﬁrms’ fundamental value. According to this hypothesis,
the positive market reaction is due to the revelation of new information
that a hedge fund has identiﬁed an undervalued company, but not due
to the announcement that a hedge fund has committed to intervene to
4See also Bhagat et al. (2004).
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enhance value to shareholders. Given the strong evidence in Table 5.1
that hedge funds target “value” ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms with low q), and the
tendency of event-ﬁrm portfolios to load positively on the Fama and
French HML factor (Table 6.1), it is plausible that obtaining the value
return is indeed a part of the hedge funds’ strategy.
Brav et al. (2008a) present several types of evidence that refute
this alternative hypothesis as the driving force. First, they ﬁnd that
when hedge funds launch activism with hostile tactics, the abnormal
return is on average 3.9% higher than non-hostile targeting. Hostile
deals, by deﬁnition, are resisted by the managers, and therefore the
changes are unlikely to happen were it not for the hedge funds’ persis-
tence. Recalling the argument that upon the announcement of activism
market prices adjust to a level reﬂecting the beneﬁt of successful inter-
vention adjusted for the equilibrium probability that the hedge fund
continues with activism and succeeds, the hedge fund will only inter-
vene when the probability-adjusted beneﬁt is greater than the cost of
intervention. Hostile deals presumably involve higher costs of interven-
tion; as a result the expected beneﬁt when a hedge fund successfully
carries out a hostile deal should be higher than a non-hostile one. There-
fore, the more favorable market response indicates that the perceived
value improvement comes from imposed changes, rather than a mere
discovery of mispricing.
Second, Brav et al. (2008a) examine the abnormal announcement
returns of the subsample where the hedge fund had revealed a signiﬁ-
cant ownership in the 13F ﬁling prior to the ﬁling of a Schedule 13D.
This subsample of events sheds light on the question of stock picking
vs. value creation through intervention since the new information in the
subsequent 13D ﬁling is not just about stock picking, but about inter-
vention. Based on the results of the cross-sectional regression in which
the dependent variable is the announcement-day abnormal return, Brav
et al. (2008a) report that the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable for the
existence of the 13F ﬁling prior to the 13D ﬁling is indeed signiﬁcantly
negative. However, they also ﬁnd that this subsample of events still
shows signiﬁcant announcement-window returns comparable to those
for the full sample despite the little additional information regarding
ownership stakes in the 13D ﬁling. These results suggest that the
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expectation regarding the hedge fund’s intervention, rather than the
information about stock pricking, drives the announcement returns.
Third, Brav et al. (2008a) ﬁnd that abnormal returns upon hedge
funds’ exit show diﬀerent patterns, contingent on whether the stated
agenda has been carried out. They show that the average abnormal
buy-and-hold return around the last Schedule 13D/A ﬁle date (i.e.,
the date of exit) for the full sample is positive leading up to the ﬁle
date, and roughly ﬂat afterward at about 4%. This result indicates that
hedge funds’ exit has a rather neutral impact on the stock price. On
the other hand, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative market response if
a hedge fund fails or withdraws from ongoing activism and exits: the
average [−20,20] window abnormal return is about −4%, signiﬁcantly
lower than the full sample average. They argue that these patterns are
inconsistent with the simple stock picking story as it does not predict
these varying abnormal return patterns upon exit.
Fourth, they argue that activist hedge funds do not appear to be
mere stock pickers because if that was the case, they should sell shortly
afterward, if not immediately after the market price adjusts to fair
valuation. In contrast, they ﬁnd that activist hedge funds continue to
hold for relatively long periods of time (see Panel C of Table 4.2).
Moreover, they ﬁnd that in 94% of the cases hedge funds exit only
after a resolution of the stated goals. It is consistent with the view that
the positive abnormal return reﬂects the market’s expectation of hedge
fund intervention, and it would be diﬃcult for the hedge fund to exit
at a high price without action.
The second alternative hypothesis attributes the positive returns
to shareholders to wealth transfer from other stakeholders. Brav et
al. (2008a) examine this “wealth transfer” hypothesis focusing on two
other important groups of stakeholders: creditors and senior manage-
ment represented by the CEOs. On the creditor side, they argue that
if shareholders of the target company gain at the expense of the cred-
itors (i.e., by increasing leverage and lowering debt rating), then the
gain should be higher in companies with higher levels of leverage, espe-
cially long-term debt because terms on short-term debt can be adjusted
quickly to reﬂect the new leverage condition. However, the relation
between abnormal announcement-window returns and the long-term
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debt ratio (scaled by the market value of capital) is economically small
conditional on other covariates: every percentage point increase in long-
term leverage is associated with a decrease of 0.03 percentage point in
announcement return. A cleaner test is obtained from the subsample
of 174 targets without any long-term debt (and hence no creditors
to expropriate). This subsample actually exhibits somewhat higher
announcement-window returns than the remaining sample that has
long-term debt. The overall evidence suggests that it is unlikely that
the expropriation of bondholders is a meaningful source of shareholder
gains in the wake of announced activism.
In contrast, evidence on activism in Japan documented by Uchida
and Xu (2008) indicates that the market’s reaction to hedge fund
activism is more favorable when the target ﬁrm has higher leverage.
However, they point out that this result seems to be driven by the par-
ticular ownership structure in Japan: the main banks are also majority
shareholders of the target ﬁrms, and thus the banks may expropriate
value through higher interest rates prior to the intervention.
Aslan and Maraachlian (2009) focus on the wealth transfer between
creditors and shareholders in hedge fund activism. Based on a data set
of activist ﬁlings at the SEC from 1996 to 2008, they ﬁnd that tar-
get bondholders earn a mean excess return of 2% around the nine-day
announcement window. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that activism events
that have well-deﬁned objectives, such as corporate governance, are
associated with higher excess bondholder returns than events that sim-
ply target the general issue of asset undervaluation. Their ﬁndings pro-
vide additional support to the view that the increased shareholder value
is driven by the active intervention of the hedge funds, rather than by
wealth transfers from bondholders. Not surprisingly, they document
that certain subset of activism, such as that aims to sell all or part
of the target ﬁrms’ assets produces negative excess bond returns on
average, where the loss is driven by the sample of bonds with weak
covenant protections.
Huang (2009) identiﬁes leveraged buyouts (LBO) as another poten-
tial channel through which activist hedge funds create value for share-
holders. He uses a sample of 237 buyout proposals in the United
States from 1990 to 2007 and documents that pre-announcement equity
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holdings by hedge funds (but not by other institutional investors, such
as pension funds and mutual funds) are positively associated with the
initial LBO premium oﬀered by the acquirer. Furthermore, he ﬁnds
that this positive relation holds only for activist hedge funds (i.e., ﬁl-
ers of Schedule 13D), and that the activist hedge funds increase their
stakes in targets after the announcement of buyout oﬀers. The latter
result suggests that hedge fund activists protect the wealth of target
shareholders by increasing their stakes in the ﬁrm in order to enhance
their bargaining power against the acquirer. Overall, his ﬁndings sug-
gest that activist hedge funds create value for target shareholders in
LBO transactions through their bargaining power over the potential
buyers, consistent with the theoretical prediction of Gomes (2001).
Jiang et al. (2009) deliver the same message from a diﬀerent angle
using a sample of U.S. bankruptcy ﬁling ﬁrms during 1996–2007. They
ﬁnd that the abnormal stock return during the bankruptcy ﬁling win-
dow is higher for the subsample where there is hedge fund among the
largest unsecured creditors. The fact that hedge funds’ inﬂuence as
creditors does not come at the expense of shareholders indicates that
they enhance the overall value of ﬁrms in Chapter 11, apparently by
providing fresh capital, reducing the frequency of ineﬃcient liquidation,
and smoothing the frictions among diﬀerent classes of claims.
On the other hand, empirical evidence supports the claim that some
of the shareholder gains come from heightened discipline to the senior
management. As Table 6.2 (the last three columns of Panel A) shows,
hedge funds are successful in forcing out entrenched CEOs, curtailing
the pay of the ones that stay, and subjecting them to higher pay-for-
performance sensitivity. Such actions tend to be viewed favorably as
enhanced governance rather than wealth expropriation.
To summarize, the evidence in the literature indicates that hedge
fund activism creates value for shareholders mainly through their active
intervention in the management of target ﬁrms (or sometimes bargain-
ing with potential acquirers), rather than by expropriating value from
creditors or simply by their superior stock picking ability. Indeed, in
light of the evidence in Griﬃn and Xu (2009), who suggest that hedge
fund managers as a group might not be superior stock pickers, the latter
hypothesis seems even less plausible.
7
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism
So far, the evidence presented in this monograph concerns the ques-
tion of whether hedge fund activism creates value for shareholders of
target ﬁrms. We now ask whether hedge fund activists create value for
the investors in their own funds. That is, do activist hedge funds earn
abnormal returns from their investment strategy? Given that activist
funds bear most of the cost of intervention but only receive a small pro-
portion of the direct gain, it is a priori unclear whether such activities
are proﬁtable to the activist funds (and, as a result, to the investors in
these hedge funds).
If one views activist investing as a new form of arbitrage (Bradley
et al., 2010), this question is interesting for at least two reasons: ﬁrst,
proﬁtability by activist hedge funds is a necessary condition for their
survival and long-term viability. Like any other arbitrage strategy, prof-
itability tends to decrease with competition as the number of hedge
funds engaging in activism has been increasing steadily over the past
few years (see Figure 6.2). A ﬁnding of equilibrium level of proﬁtabil-
ity ensures that hedge fund activism will remain a staple of corporate
governance in the foreseeable future.
Second, if markets are eﬃcient, abnormal returns to an investment
strategy should persist only when activists have private information.
235
236 Returns to Hedge Fund Activism
In the conventional setting, superior information is about the value
of the ﬁrm that is assumed to be out of the control of the investors
(and unknown to the market). In the context of activist investing,
the value of the ﬁrm could be potentially aﬀected by the activist’s
action. As a result, the player’s superior information about his own
intention to intervene becomes valuable.1 This non-conventional form
of private information calls for possible extensions of the existing reg-
ulation regarding informed trading. For example, when a lead hedge
fund “tips” a small set of investors (e.g., members of a “wolf-pack”)
about its intention to launch activism before ﬁling the Schedule 13D,
it allows the informed parties to gain at the expense of the uninformed
sellers. However, such actions do not violate any existing rules because
the private information is not proprietary about the ﬁrm. Similarly, the
hedge fund could trade on derivatives based on the private information
about its own agenda (Hu and Black, 2006; Brav and Mathews, 2009),
which has become a contentious issue in the recent debate regarding
disclosure.
7.1 Returns to Activist Funds
Brav et al. (2008b) oﬀer a detailed analysis of the return to activist
hedge funds based on two data sources: a combination of databases
based on self-reporting hedge funds; and the institutional quarterly
holdings maintained by the Thomson 13F database. First, Brav et al.
(2008b) merge two major hedge fund databases: the Center for
International Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM) database,
maintained by the University of Massachusetts; and HedgeFund.net, a
leading commercial database distributed by the Channel Capital Group
Inc. They are able to match 103 unique funds that have at least 12
months of return data from the combination of the two databases.
They retrieve hedge fund returns from January 1995 (or the earliest
available date) through June 2007 (or the latest reporting date).
1See Cornelli and Li (2002), and Bond and Eraslan (2009) for theoretical analysis of
informed trading where private information comes from the knowledge of one’s own inten-
tion or action.
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To analyze the performance of activist hedge funds, they measure
their one- and four-factor alphas using 36-month (or as many months as
possible, subject to having at least 12 months of data) rolling window
factor loadings, which allow time-varying loadings on the factors by the
hedge funds. To benchmark activist performance against that of other
self-reported, non-activist hedge funds, they repeat the measurement of
fund alphas for two comparison hedge fund samples: the ﬁrst includes
all hedge funds covered by HedgeFund.net; and the second includes all
equity-oriented hedge funds in HedgeFund.net.
Based on this sample of activist and non-activist hedge funds, Brav
et al. (2008b) ﬁnd that activist hedge funds on average perform bet-
ter than the full sample of self-reported hedge funds and the subset
of equity-oriented hedge funds by both the one- and four-factor alpha
measures. Speciﬁcally, they report that the average (median) one- and
four-factor monthly alphas of the sample activist hedge funds are 0.71%
(0.68%) and 0.64% (0.63%), as compared to 0.41% (0.33%) and 0.39%
(0.29%) for the full sample of hedge funds. They also report that the
average loadings on the market, size, value, and momentum factors are
0.33, 0.27, 0.17, and 0.04, respectively, indicating that most activist
hedge funds over-weight small and value ﬁrms, but are not momen-
tum players. In addition, the relatively low loading on the market
factor indicates that activists probably hold positions beyond purely
long positions in common stocks. But Brav et al. (2008b) ﬁnd that
the commonly used non-equity factors are not signiﬁcant in the return
regressions for the activist funds. The size and value tilt is consistent
with the characteristics of the target companies described in Section 5
as well as the long-term regression results discussed in Section 6.2.
Boyson and Mooradian (2007) report a similar magnitude of excess
returns for activist hedge funds using the TASS hedge fund database.
They ﬁnd a matched sample of non-activist hedge funds based on fund
style and size for each activist fund, and then compare the 24-month
four- and seven-factor alphas (Fung and Hsieh, 2004) between the
activist and non-activist groups of funds for the year before activism.
They report that the median four- and seven-factor monthly alphas for
the sample of activist hedge funds are 0.58 and 0.66%, while they are
0.45% and 0.50% for the matched sample of non-activist hedge funds.
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In addition, they ﬁnd that the mean monthly seven-factor alpha of
activist hedge funds is 0.27% higher than that of non-activist funds,
suggesting that activist hedge funds in their sample on average have
earned 3.3% of annual excess returns over returns to non-activist hedge
funds in one year prior to activism. However, their conclusion on the
performance of activist hedge funds is mixed because they do not ﬁnd
an incremental return performance among activist funds during the
24 months after the activism using both four- and seven-factor alphas.
Needless to say, the return discussed above does not accrue entirely
to the hedge funds since launching activism is costly. Gantchev (2009)
is the only work that calibrates the net return after incorporating such
costs, especially at the stage of a proxy contest. Using a dataset of 1,492
hedge fund campaigns between 2000 and 2007, he ﬁnds that the average
activist campaign costs $10.5 million, or about one-third of the aver-
age gross deal return. Outside the United States, Becht et al. (2009)
examine the long-term performance of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund
(HUKFF). Their results suggest that the U.K. activist fund earns posi-
tive abnormal returns: an annual excess internal rate of return (IRR) of
4.9% during the sample period from 1998 to 2004. Furthermore, alphas
from the regression of the fund’s returns on the one and four factors
are signiﬁcantly positive (0.41 and 0.86% per month, respectively). The
magnitude is comparable to the average abnormal performance of U.S.
activist funds.
7.2 Selection Bias and Returns to Activism
One drawback of the return analyses based on self-reported hedge fund
databases in the previous section is related to the potential selection
bias that comes from self-reporting. That is, hedge funds that choose
to report to one or multiple commercial databases may or may not
have the same average return performance as a full universe of hedge
funds (Baquero et al., 2005). Brav et al. (2008b) address this issue
of section bias by examining Thomson Financial 13F ﬁlings, which
provide quarterly long equity positions for 147 of their hedge funds.
They construct the returns from the equity long-only position of their
sample funds by assuming that they hold the most recently disclosed
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positions. This strategy is meant to capture the returns to the private
information possessed by the activist funds, and is not implementable
for outside investors given the 45-day lag between the quarter end and
the ﬁling date.
Brav et al. (2008b) report that the quarter-end equity holdings of
the sample activist hedge funds on average outperform the market by
0.6–0.9% per month, a sizable premium given the lack of abnormal
performance of 13F holding returns for hedge funds (see Griﬃn and
Xu, 2009) in general. This is consistent with the results discussed in the
previous section that activist hedge funds seem to be better performers
among all hedge funds.
Interestingly, this result suggests that a tradable “copy cat” strat-
egy that holds the most recent publicly available activist hedge funds’
13F holdings could yield positive alphas. It is indeed the case but Brav
et al. (2008b) ﬁnd that the magnitude from the implementable strat-
egy (incorporating a two-month delay to reﬂect the timing of holdings
information disclosure) is less impressive. The diﬀerence between the
returns of the copy cat strategy and the hedge funds’ long positions
indicates that some of the superior returns can be attributed to non-
public information, and this advantage dissipates as the information is
disseminated through the 13F ﬁlings.
Additionally, Brav et al. (2008b) provide evidence from the 13F
holdings return that more successful funds are no more likely to report
to hedge fund databases, which suggests that the selection bias might
not be a big concern in examining the performance of activist hedge
funds. Among the 147 13F-ﬁling funds, 64 also report to at least one of
the two hedge fund databases mentioned earlier. They ﬁnd that the self-
reporting funds on average have somewhat lower excess returns as well
as one- and four-factor alphas, but the diﬀerences are not statistically
signiﬁcant.
7.3 Cross-sectional Variation in Return
to Hedge Fund Activism
Only few papers provide evidence on the cross-sectional variation in the
return of activist hedge funds. Based on regression results in which the
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dependent variables are four- and one-factor alphas, Brav et al. (2008b)
show that most of independent variables related to the style of activism
and the characteristics of funds are insigniﬁcant except that high fees
tend to be charged by funds that deliver better performance. These
results indicate that fund performance is very diﬃcult to predict from
observed characteristics, consistent with the theoretical work (Berk and
Green, 2004) and empirical evidence (Liang, 2001) in the literature. In
addition, Boyson and Mooradian (2007) try to relate the performance
of activist hedge funds with activism strategies. Their evidence suggests
that activist hedge funds that pursue aggressive activism, particularly
corporate governance changes, tend to earn higher risk-adjusted returns
than those focusing on the undervaluation of the target assets (i.e.,
passive activism).
8
Conclusion
This review serves as a comprehensive survey of research on hedge fund
activism, a new phenomenon that has emerged during the past decade
and has been widespread across sectors and multiple countries. We
review activists’ objectives, tactics, and choices of target companies. We
then analyze value creation brought about by activist hedge funds, both
for shareholders in the target companies and for investors in the hedge
funds, and distinguish the value eﬀect from alternative hypotheses such
as stock picking and wealth transfer. The multitude of evidence from
diﬀerent studies generally supports the view that hedge fund activism
creates value for shareholders by eﬀectively inﬂuencing the governance,
capital structure decisions, and operating performance of target ﬁrms.
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